University of Michigan Law School

University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Book Chapters

Faculty Scholarship

1968

'Custodial Interrogation' within the Meaning of Miranda
Yale Kamisar

University of Michigan Law School, ykamisar@umich.edu

Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/book_chapters/29

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/book_chapters
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, Evidence Commons, Law
Enforcement and Corrections Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons

Publication Information & Recommended Citation
Kamisar, Yale. "'Custodial Interrogation' within the Meaning of Miranda." In Criminal Law and the
Constitution, 335-85. Ann Arbor, Mich.: Institute of Continuing Legal Education, 1968.

This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan
Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Book Chapters by an authorized
administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

4
''Custodial Interrogation''
~lthln The Meaning
of Miranda
By Yale Kamisar*
Police Station Interrogation vs. "Field Interrogation"

Probably the most difficult and frequently raised question
in the wake of Miranda is what constitutes the "in-custody interrogation" or "custodial questioning" which must be preceded by
the Miranda warnings. Since the pre-Miranda controversy had
centered over what rights the suspect enjoyed after he was
brought to the police station, see e.g.) Breitel, Criminal Law and
Criminal justice) 1966 UTAH L. REv. l, 8-9; since the Court had
much experience with police station interrogation but had never
decided a case considering the application of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments to "on the street" or "on the spot" questioning;
and since the four cases it decided in Miranda all involved
"incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a policedominated atmosphere" (384 U.S. at 445), it is hardly surprising
that the opinion is not very illuminating as to what is meant
by "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way" (id. at 444,
emphasis added) or "police interrogation while in custody at the
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.
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station or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action m any
significant way" (id. at 477, emphasis added).
In many respects these general definitions are not much more
helpful than the terms they define-except that they seem to
make fairly plain that the scope of Miranda is not limited to
police station interrogation nor even · to instances where the
suspect is technically or formally under "arrest." It seems that
again and again the Court studiously avoided use of the term
"arrest" in favor of less technical and more general terms such
as "custody" and "significant deprivation of freedom." By including some "field" and "squad car" questioning within its coverage,
the Court understandably (albeit gingerly and uncertainly) sought
to protect its flanks. If "custodial interrogation" were limited to
questioning in a police station or to questioning that occurs
after a formal arrest, "the police would need only to delay
formal arrest or physical transfer of an accused to the station
house in order to circumvent the constitutional safeguards
Miranda dictates." Commonwealth v. Stites, 427 Pa. 486, 235 A.
2d 387, 390 (1967). See generally SoBEL, THE NEw CoNFESSION
STANDARDS 56-58 (1966).
The primary conceptual hurdle confronting the Miranda Court
was the "legal reasoning" that any and all police interrogation
is unaffected by the privilege against self-incrimination because
such interrogation does not involve any kind of judicial process
for the taking of testimony; inasmuch as police officers have no
legal authority to compel statements of any kind, there is no
legal obligation, ran the argument, to which a privilege can apply.
See, e.g., the discussion and authorities collected in Kamisar, A
Dissent from the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the
"New" Fifth Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test, 65
MICH. L. REv. 59, 65, 69, 77-83 (1966). In the course of toppling
this "legal reasoning" the Court dwelt on the cases before it and
many extracts from police interrogation manuals as the most
obvious and graphic examples of the unreality, inadequacy and
casuistry of the old reasoning. "The current practice of incommunicado interrogation" was so "at odd.s with" the principle
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that "the individual may not be compelled to incriminate himself," pp. 457-58; the coercive pressures generated when a defendant was thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and run
through menacing police interrogation· procedures," p. 457;
were so substantial, that the only tenable view, according to the
Miranda majority, was that the privilege had to "apply to informal compulsion exerted by law-enforcement officers during
in-custody questioning," p. 46I, had to be "available outside of
criminal court proceedings," p. 467. But to limit the impact of
Miranda to the most poignant examples of the need for the
applicability of the privilege to non-judicial, informal confrontations-as some state cases seem to suggest, see, e.g.) State v.
Meadows, 272 N.C. 327, I58 S.E.2d 638, 644 (I968); Commonwealth v. Ep~rjesi, 423 Pa. 455, 224 A. 2d 2I6, 223 (I966); Gaudio
v. State, I Md. App. 455, 230 A. 2d 700, 707-08 (Ct. Spec. App.,
Md., I967); cf. People v. P. (Anonymous), 2I N.Y. 2d I, 233 N. E.
2d 255, 257-58, 26I ( I967)-mistakes, it is submitted, the "advocacy" in the Miranda opinion, if you want to call it that, for
its scope.
Although the Miranda opinion itself may not be read to cover
only police station interrogation, it is possible, of course, that
in the years ahead a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court will so
cut down Miranda. In Mathis v. United States, 88 Sup. Ct. I503
( I968), the three Miranda dissenters still on the Court made it
plain that this is one way they would like to narrow the scope
of that landmark decision. In Mathis, an Internal Revenue
agent failed to give petitioner the Miranda warnings when
questioning him about his prior income tax returns while petitioner was incarcerated in a state jail serving a state sentence.
A 5-3 majority, per Justice Black (Marshall, J., not participating),
rejected the government's arguments that Miranda was inapplicable because (I) the questioning was part of a "routine tax
investigation" and (2) petitioner had not been jailed by the
interrogating federal officers but was there for an entirely
different offense, as "differences . . . too minor and shadowy
to justify a departure from the well-considered conclusion of
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Miranda with reference to warnings to be given to a person held
in custody." 1 However, dissenting Justice White, joined by Harlan
and Stewart, J J ., maintained that
Miranda rested not on the mere fact of physical restriction
but on a conclusion that coercion-pressure to answer questions-usually flows from a certain type of custody, police
station interrogation of someone charged with or suspected
of a crime. Although petitioner was confined, he was at the
time of interrogation in familiar surroundings. . . . The
rationale of Miranda has no relevance to inquiries conducted
outside the allegedly hostile and forbidding atmosphere
surrounding police station interrogation of a criminal suspect.
(88 Sup. Ct. at 1506) (Emphasis added.)

"Custody" vs. "Focus"
It is plain that Miranda applies to situations not covered by
Escobedo, i.e., to custodial questioning of one not yet the
"prime suspect," "central figure," "target" or "focal point" of
an investigation. See, e.g., Mathis supra, McFall, supra, Commonwealth v. Banks, - - Pa. --, 239 A. 2d 416 (1968) (rejecting
1. See also the pre-Mathis case of People v. McFall, 66 Cal. Rptr. 277 (Ct.

App. lst Dist., Div. 2, 1968) where the court rejected the prosecution's
claim that Miranda was inapplicable because when questioned about
ownership of the car he was driving defendant was not in custody on
any charge relating to the vehicle but was arrested on fraudulent checks
and forgery charges. Pointed out the court, at 279:
Granting that the charges upon which defendant was arrested are
totally unrelated to the subsequent charge of auto theft and that
the questioning as to the car ownership was only investigatory, the
rationale and explicit language of the Miranda decision rule out any
such limitation on present admissibility requirements . . . [C]onsidering the evil against which Miranda is directed, it is the fact of custodial interrogation rather than its cause or the accusatory nature of
the questions asked which necessitates the application of Miranda.
In light of Mathis, People v. Bolinski, 67 Cal. Rptr. S47 (Ct. App. 4th
Dist. Div. 2, 1968), which held that a person under "technical arrest" for
certain offenses (tampering with gas pumps and a traffic violation) could
be questioned about a different offense (auto theft), would seem to have
been wrongly decided.
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argument that defendant need not have been warned because
he was merely being questioned as "a witness"). But are the
Miranda warnings required when the converse is true? When
the suspect is not in custody or significantly deprived of his
freedom, but he is a "prime suspect" or the "focal point" of an
investigation? Does Escobedo supplement Miranda or has it been
displaced by it?
After defining "custodial interrogation" as ~·questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way," the Court, as Professor Kenneth Graham aptly put
it, Graham, What is "Custodial Interrogation?": California's Anticpatory Application of Miranda v. Arizona, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REv.
59, 114 (1966), "drops an obfuscating footnote": "This is what
we meant in Escobedo when we spoke of an investigation which
had focused on an accused." (p. 444 n. 4)
Although, as Professor Graham suggests, in his painstaking
analysis of this point, footnote 4 may indicate that "custody"
and "focus" are to be alternative grounds for requiring the
warnings, that "the Court may wish to push the rule to cover
situations where there is no custody, in the usual sense of the
term, to restrict, for example, deliberate use of i.nformers to
elicit evidence, as in Massiah" [377 U.S. 201, 12 L.Ed. 2d 246, 84
S.Ct. 1199 (1964)], or to prohibit any questioning "of persons who
... could have been arrested" or "are ready to be prosecuted,"
~d. at 115-17, this writer is of the view that, as Professor Graham
also suggests, id. at 114-15, Miranda's use of "custodial interrogation" actually marks a fresh start in describing the point at which
the Constitutional protections begin. Under this latter view,
footnote 4 only amounts to an understandable, but misleading,
attempt to maintain some continuity with a recent precedent
which, although (perhaps because) it marked an important new
chapter in the law of confessions, was a more groping and
looser opinion than Miranda. But see Windsor v. United States,
389 F. 2d 530, 534 (5th Cir. 1968) (viewing the "focus" test as
alternative ground for requiring Miranda warnings); Common-
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wealth v. jefferson, 423 Pa. 541, 226 A. 2d 765, 768 (1967) (same);
People v. Glover, 52 Misc. 2d 425, 276 N.Y.S. 2d 461, 466 (1966)
(same); People v. Allen, 50 Misc. 2d 897, 272 N.Y.S. 2d 249, 251,
rev'd mem., 281 N.Y.S. 2d 602 (1967) (same); Hoffman, J., dissenting in Commonwealth v. Barclay, 240 A. 2d 838 (Super. Ct.
Pa. 1968) (same); People v. Ceccone, 67 Cal. Rptr. 499 (Ct. App.
2d Dist., Div. 3, 1968) (once investigation becomes "focused upon"
suspect, interrogation becomes "custodial"); cf. Allen v. United
States, 390 F. 2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (whether investigation had
"focused on" suspect a major factor in determining whether he
was being subjected to "custodial interrogation"). 2
Since this very issue was disputed by participants at the conference on Escobedo and Miranda held by the Institute of
Continuing Legal Education during the summer of 1966, it may
be profitable to quote at length from the pertinent panel
evaluation at this 1966 conference, A New Look at Confessions:
Escobedo- The Second Round 91-94, 98-102 (George ed. 1967):
"[Dean John W.] REED: . . . I observed that Professor
Kamisar said, and I read some of Judge Edwards' remarks
to suggest the same point, that to a large extent Miranda
displaces Escobedo. This reminded me of the case of an
informal visit to a person's home by a policeman who
says, 'You are not under any compulsion to admit me or
answer questions.' Since suspicion has focused on that person,
and let's assume it has, he is really being questioned because
he is a suspect, and is being interrogated without counsel.
Escobedo conceivably would apply to outlaw this practice,
or would have applied but for Miranda) but Miranda would
not preclude the questioning. I think both these gentlemen
are saying in this situation that if there is truly no compulsion on the defendant to speak, and thus no basis to
apply Miranda, one may still apply Escobedo.
"Am I foolish in suggesting at this point that Escobedo
might still apply, and that the heavy burden on the police
2. These cases are discussed at length infra, pp. 362-371, 374-378.
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in the individual case should be to comply with both rules?
Why is Escobedo inapplicable to this kind of case?
"KAMISAR: I think the Supreme Court has made it
fairly plain that if a man is not in custody, is not really
restrained, no warning has to be given. The function of
the Miranda warnings is to dispel the coercion inherent
in police custodial surroundings and the interrogation
process, to relieve the suspect of anxieties generated when he
is torn from a familiar environment and thrust into a
police-dominated atmosphere, or to relieve him of the
typically lesser but still substantial anxieties created when
he is restrained 'on the street' by uniformed officers and
questioned there or in the squad car. If a suspect is not
being significantly restrained, not being subjected to 'custodial interrogation,' there is no inherent coercion to
neutralize, no inherent anxiety to counteract.
"A clear case would be one where an individual is interviewed in the presence of a friend or relative. This situation
does not require issuance of the Miranda warnings-even
though the police have 'focused' on him, even though he is
the 'prime suspect.' I think it is quite legitimate to read
Miranda as encouraging the police to engage more extensively in pre-arrest, pre-custody, pre-restraint questioning.
Apparently the F.B.I. has done this over the years with
considerable success. So it seems have the District of Columbia
police as they have felt the brunt of the McNabb-Mallory
rule. Ought we not encourage the police to do this? Does
this not avoid the stigma of an arrest for a felony as well as
the greater coercion generated by an arrest and a forced trip
to the police station?
"I realize we quickly run into some very difficult problems,
such as exactly when an 'arrest' takes place, and when it is
that an individual feels free to move on and when he does
not. In many ambiguous situations, it seems to me, the
officer must make it clear to the individual that he is 'free'
if he wants to establish later that the man was not 'arrested.'
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"As I read Miranda, it is not simply a bigger and better
(or worse, depending upon your viewpoint) Escobedo. It is
quite different. Escobedo assigns primary significance to the
amount of evidence of guilt available to the police at the
time of questioning; hence there is much talk about 'prime
suspects,' 'focal point,' and the 'accusatory' stage. Miranda, on
the other hand, attaches pi'imary significance to the conditions surrounding or inherent in the interrogation setting;
hence it includes much talk of 'police-dominated' or 'government-established atmosphere' that 'carries its own badge of
intimidation,' 'compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings,' 'subjugating the individual to the will of his examiner,'
'putting the defendant in such an emotional state as to
impair his capacity for rational judgment,' and the like. If
the requisite inherent pressures, intimidation and anxieties
exist, Miranda applies whether in the eyes of the police the
subject is a prime suspect or no suspect at all, whether he
is plainly the 'accused' or only a 'potential witness.' On the
other hand, absent these conditions the person subjected
to police questioning is not entitled to the Miranda warnings
-no matter how much the police have 'focused' on him or
to what extent they regard him as the 'prime' suspect, the
only suspect or 'the accused.' Miranda has broadened and
deepened Escobedo in some respects, but narrowed it in
others. Miranda has not enlarged Escobedo as much as
it has displaced it. . . .
"REED: Doesn't the mere fact of questioning by a uniformed officer rather than a plainclothes detective have a
significant deterrent influence on the conduct of the individual? He says, 'Well you are free to go,' but the
individual knows or feels that if he starts to go, he may
indeed then be arrested. Isn't this the same thing as detention?
"KAMISAR: Of course any questioning anywhere by a
police officer generates some pressures and anxieties, but this
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is also true of 'general on-the-scene questioning' and of visits
by police at one's home or place of business, even in the
presence of a relative or friend. In the latter situations,
however, the Court tells us that the requisite warnings need
not be given (or, at least, need not always be given) because
'the compelling atmosphere inherent in the process of incustody_ interrogation is not necessarily present' [see 384
U.S. at 478].
"Suppose the officer says: 'Little Miss So-and-So is missing
and we are going around the neighborhood checking this
out. Can you help us?' It is not at all clear to me that the
man who comes to the door of his house will be arrested
or feels that he will be arrested if he says: 'I'm busy,' or
'No, I won't cooperate; that's your problem, not mine.'
But how often does this really come up? I think very, very
few people slam doors in officers' faces when they ask for
cooperation. I know I don't, and presumably I am equipped
to be tougher than most in such situations. The overwhelming
majority of citizens will talk, will cooperate. This is evidenced
by the experience of the F.B.I. and the District of Columbia
police.
"[Judge Robert C.] FINLEY: I do not find myself too
much in agreement with Professor Kamisar except on the
inapplicability of the Miranda requirements to an interview
at the home, which is a rather casual sort of inquiry. But
I think that even that is not absolute. If the police are
pretty well informed that this man is a hot suspect or that
he is likely to give some very definite leads or information,
we run into the problem of the 'poisonous tree' doctrine ....
"Law enforcement people must take a position that where
there is reason to think they are really hot on the trail
of the fellow who committed a crime or who knows something about it, they must give a reasonable warning at that
time. Certainly to stop a man in the street is not to take
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him into custody as such, but it is a restraint of the man's
freedom when he is stopped. He is under some compulsion
at that time. . . .
"KAMISAR: I think we are running into some confusion.
I thought I made it clear that when a man is stopped on
the street by the police, when a man is restrained by the
police, the warnings may be required. On the other hand,
even though the police have focused on a man, even if the
man has become the 'prime suspect,' the warnings are not
required if the authorities have not deprived the suspect of
his freedom of action. At least, this is how I read Miranda.
This is what I mean when I say that Miranda, in a sense,
has displaced, not simply clarified and expanded Escobedo.
"For example, suppose a woman is murdered and everybody in town is convinced that her husband did it. The
police are convinced that the husband is the only one who
could have done it. The husband is the hottest suspect
imaginable. The police pay a call on him. He is sitting in
the living room talking to his brother. The police say to
him: 'We're not arresting you. You are free to tell us to
leave. Your brother can stay here and listen if he wants to
do so. But if you are willing, we'd like to talk to you about
your wife's death. Maybe we missed something. Maybe you
can give us some new leads.' The husband responds, 'O.K.
I'll go over it again. Maybe I can help you.' Let's make it
easy. He asks his brother to stay and the latter agrees to do so.
The husband is not entitled to the Miranda warnings. As I
see it, the test is no longer (if it ever was) how much information the police have when they approach a suspect,
but how they approach him, whether he is being subjected
to inherent or implicit or indirect pressure in a degree that
requires the neutralizing, offsetting warnings.
"One way we could test this hypothesis would be in the
case of an undercover agent. Suppose a man is a prime
suspect and, after consulting with the police, a confederate
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of the suspect or a friend agrees to try to draw the suspect
out about the crime-without revealing, of course, that he
is working for the police, that he is, in effect, a government
agent. By hypothesis, there is no coercion at all, not even
of the subtle or indirect variety, because the suspect has no
idea that he is talking to a government agent. He thinks
he is only talking to a confederate or a friend. There is no
badge, no uniform, no pressure in the atmosphere. As the
law stands right now, I would say that, assuming the suspect
has not yet been formally charged, and assuming further
that the undisclosed government agent uses no objectionable
interrogation tactics and utilizes no trickery or deception
other than merely failing to disclose he is working with the
police, the Miranda warnings need not be given, so that
any resulting incriminating statements obtained without
those warnings would be admissible. This would be true, as
I see it, regardless of how much the law enforcement authorities may have 'focused' on the suspect.
"[Attorney General Thomas C.] LYNCH: I am wondering
if there aren't some overtones of Massiah v. United States,
377 U.S. 201 (1964), in the situation Professor Kamisar has
just described?
"KAMISAR: I assume that the man has not been indicted
or otherwise formally charged. As I read Massiah, it applies
only when a man has been formally charged or has retained
counsel. Both these factors were present in Massiah. The
Supreme Court has not outlawed the use of undercover
agents as such. A long line of cases holds or assumes that
an apparent friend or acquaintance who is really working
with the authorities can engage the suspect in conversation
and try to elicit an incriminating statement. The real battle
has been over whether the friend or acquaintance may do so
when 'wired for sound.' Even here, however, a majority of
the Court to date has answered in the affirmative. Some
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members of the Court have dissented, but their quarrel seems
to be with the use of hidden microphones or hidden recorders
on the person of the undercover agents, not with the employment of undercover agents as such. . . .
"LYNCH: I think Professor Kamisar oversimplified the
undercover agent illustration. He said the only deception
that was practiced there was that the person was in plain
clothes and that he did not disclose that he was an officer
or working with an officer. Obviously in an undercover
situation the person has to make some statements to the
proposed defendant. For example, he says he is going to buy
some narcotics from him. He explains why he has to buy
them-either he is a dealer or he needs a shot for himself.
How do you reconcile that with the expression of the Court,
limited as it is, that you cannot use trickery and cajolery in
obtaining the waiver?
"(Judge George] EDWARDS: These refinements of what
Miranda means are going to come up in the future to
torture prosecuting attorneys and judges in the trial and
appellate courts. But I want to suggest something very simple
about this whole process as far as the police officer is concerned. He has no need whatever to become involved in
this sort of detailed consideration of whether or not a confession under certain circumstances, or a volunteered statement under certain circumstances, will be admissible. It
seems to me he needs to keep in mind two specific things,
and both of them are simple and relatively easy to apply.
First, if he has restrained a man of his liberty in any significant
way and is proceeding to question him, he must give the
citizen the required warning. Second, whether he has restrained him or not, if he knows that the citizen is the
prime suspect in relation to a crime and he plans to interrogate him, he should give the warning.
"As far as I am concerned, these are the two simple means
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by which an officer can stay on the safe side of the Miranda
requirements. If police want us to tell them how fine they
can cut it, that is a different question ,and on that they will
hear all sorts of fancy differences of opinion. But I doubt
that anybody is going to contest the idea that to follow
these two rules will leave the police safely within the
Miranda opinion.
"[Chief Vincent W.J PIERSANTE: I wanted to comment
on the undercover officer's position because it is very important to law enforcement. Because the pre-arrest investigation is becoming more and more valuable to us, we will
engage in more and more undercover operations. In my
view the undercover operator is not engaging in interrogation
in the sense in which we usually use the term. I want to
back up Professor Kamisar's position that an undercover
operator has freedom of operation outside of Miranda.
"KAMISAR: We ought to deal in terms of what law
enforcement men can continue to do in good faith. Reading
the cases presently on the books reasonably and fairly, law
enforcement officials may continue to engage in undercover
work along the lines previously suggested. Now, I may be
wrong in the case where the 'target' of the undercover agent
is already a 'prime suspect.' It may be that Escobedo has not
been displaced, as I think it has, and that Escobedo and
Miranda stand alongside each each other and furnish the
suspect double protection. My position, however, is that law
enforcement authorities are entitled to proceed on the
assumption that whether or not a man is a prime suspect
they can proceed to question him without giving him the
requisite warnings if the man is not being restrained or
coerced but is really remaining 'voluntarily.' "
A short few months after the aforementioned panel discussion
was held, the U.S. Supreme Court came to grips with the work
of the undercover agent in light of Massiah, Escobedo and Mir-
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anda and, it is submitted, lent considerable support to the view
that the "focus" test was scrapped by Miranda. In Hoffa v. United
States, 385 U.S. 293, 17 L. Ed. 2d 374, 87 S. Ct. 408 (1966) one
Partin, whom the Court assumed was a paid government informer,
testified to several incriminating statements which he said Hoffa
made about endeavoring to bribe the Test Fleet jury, although
Hoffa had made these statements after a point in time when the
government had sufficient ground for taking him into custody and
charging him with this offense. The Court purported to be
stunned by Hoffa's argument that since government agents could
not have continued to question him without observance of his
Sixth Amendment right to counsel if they had taken him into
custody, evidence of statements made in the presence of Partin
after the point in time when government agents could have taken
him into custody likewise flouted his right to counsel.
Retorted the Court, per Justice Stewart, 385 U.S. at 310:
Nothing in Massiah, in Escobedo, or in any other case that
has come to our attention, even remotely suggests this novel
and paradoxical constitutional doctrine, and we decline to
adopt it now. There is no constitutional right to be arrested.
The police are not required to guess at their peril the
precise moment at which they have probable cause to
arrest a suspect, risking a violation of the Fourth Amendment
if they act too soon, and a violation of the Sixth Amendment
if they wait too long. Law enforcement officers are under no
constitutional duty to call a halt to a criminal investigation
the moment they have the minimum evidence to establish
probable cause . . .
As has been pointed out however, "Hoffa's lawyers had simply
chosen inartistic phrasing for an argument substantially drawn
from the Court's own opinions," principally Escobedo's emphasis on "focus"; "when suspicion had focused on Hoffa the
general investigation was functionally complete; at that point,
he was the accused and thereby entitled to the absolute protection
of the privilege against self-incrimination [and the protection
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of counsel]." Note, judicial Control of Secret Agents, 76 YALE
L. 1. 994, 1008 ( 1967).
The Court also made short work of Hoffa's contention that his
right under the Fifth Amendmem not to "be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself" was violated by
the admission of Partin's testimony. Although Hoffa could hardly
have been said to have made a "knowing and intelligent waiver"
by talking to, and in the presence of, an apparent friend and
court retainer in his entourage who was actually a secret government agent, the Court considered it necessary only to deal with
"compulsion" or "coercion," id., at 304:
[A]ll have agreed that a necessary element of compulsory
self-incrimination is some kind of compulsion. Thus, in the
Miranda case, dealing with the Fifth Amendment's impact
upon police interrogation of persons in custody, the Court
predicated its decision upon the conclusion 'that without
proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of
persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently
compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he
would not otherwise do so freely .. .' 384 U.S., at 467.
In the present case no claim has been or could be made that
the petitioner's incriminating statements were the product of
any sort of coercion, legal or factual. The petitioner's conversations were wholly voluntary.
Since Partin had not actively elicited Hoffa's incriminating
statements, another case decided the same day as Hoff a, Osborn
v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 17 L. Ed. 2d 394, 87 S. Ct. 429
(1966), affirming the conviction of one of Hoffa's attorneys for
endeavoring to bribe a prospective federal juror, seems to pose
a stronger case for the applicability of Escobedo andjor Miranda.
For the government spy in Osborn who posed as petitioner's
"investigator" made at least an overture toward crime by mentioning that he knew some of the prospective jurors, and that
one was his cousin, and in subsequent meetings, he told petitioner,
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falsely, that he found his cousin "susceptible to money for
hanging this jury." Moreover, when, in response to a detailed
factual affidavit, the judges of the federal district court authorized
federal agents to conceal a recorder on the person of petitioner's
"investigator," in order to determine from recordings of future
conversations between him and petitioner whether the latter was
in fact trying to bribe a prospective juror, it _certainly seems that
the investigation had "focused" on him. But neither the question
of self-incrimination nor the right to counsel is considered in the
Osborn opinion although Justice Douglas, the sole dissenter,
protested: "Encouraging a person to talk into a concealed 'bug'
may not be compulsion within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. But allowing the transcript to be used against the accused
is using the force and power of the law to make a man talk
against his will ... " 385 U.S. at 351-52.
An opportunity to shed further light on the scope of Massiah
andjor Escobedo was lost when on the last day of the 1967-68
Term, the Supreme Court, with four .Justices dissenting,
dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted, 88
Sup. Ct. - - (1968), in People v. Miller, 245 Cal. App. 2d 112,
53 Cal. Rep. 720 (4th Dist., Div. 1, 1966). Petitioner was
arrested for murder and was taken to a county jail, where she
was booked on that charge and placed in a cell. Not only did
she meet with counsel, but in an attempt to prevent questioning
of his client, counsel set up a 24-hour-a-day watch of her cell.
But an undercover agent was falsely booked into the jail on a
fictitious charge and placed in petitioner's cell. Although this
occurred prior to any formal charge being filed against petitioner,
the agent remained in petitioner's cell, eliciting information
after a complaint was formally filed charging petitioner with murder or conversing with petitioner for two more days. In light of
Massiah and Escobedo, the California District Court of Appeal
viewed the law enforcement activity as "completely indefensible,"
"most inexcusable" and "almost incredible," but found that the
admission of petitioner's statements was not "prejudicial error"
and moreover, that objection to it was waived.
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Dissenting from the dismissal of the writ and urging reversal,
Justice Marshall, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Douglas
and Brennan, indicated that even though petitioner had not yet
been formally indicted, once petitioner had been arrested and
booked for murder the investigation had "begun to focus on
a particular suspect" and Massiah, as expanded by Escobedo, applied. The dissenters maintained, further, that whether or not
the undercover agent "interrogated petitioner," "her presence
itself was an inducement to speak, and an inducement by a
police agent." Id. at --. But the dissenters also assigned weight
to the fact that "petitioner was in custody without bail, with a
consequent lack of freedom to choose her companions"; she
was represented by counsel at all times; a formal complaint had
been filed before the agent had terminated her work in petitioner's
cell; and the agent was more than a mere "listening post" -in
various ways she deceived petitioner and subverted her rights.
Id. at--.
Moreover, the position of the dissenters is further beclouded
by the fact that they did not consider the impact, if any, of
Miranda on Massiah and Escobedo because, as they specifically
noted, p. - - n. 14, petitioner's trial was begun more than a
year prior to Miranda, thus rendering that decision inapplicable.

"Volunteered" Statements vs. Statements Made in
Response to "Interrogation"

The Court pointed out in Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478:
Confessions remain a proper element in law enforcement.
Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any
compelling influence, is of course, admissible in evidence.
The fundamental import of the privilege while an individual
is in custody is not whether he is allowed to talk to the
police without the benefit of warnings and counsel, but
whether he can be interrogated. There is no requirement
that police stop a person who enters a police station and
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states that he wishes to confess to a crime, or a person who
calls the police to offer a confession or any other statement
he desires to make. Volunteered statements of any kind are
not barred by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility
is not affected by our holding today. (Emphasis added).
Among the cases illustrating the points made in the passage
just quoted are:
Parson v. United States, 387 F. 2d 944 (lOth Cir., 1968) (on
learning defendants were AWOL, a sheriff held them pending
arrival of military authorities; when, in the course of trying to
move defendants' car off the street, sheriff discovered the key
found in personal effects of one defendant wouldn't work, sheriff
claimed he was being given "runaround" about the key, whereupon one defendant made the unresponsive remark that they
had stolen the car and the other defendant confirmed this);
State v. Intogna, 101 Ariz. 275, 419 P.2d 59 (1966) (on hearing
gun shots, officer immediately went to scene where he saw fatally
wounded victim on sidewalk; on being told by bystander that a
man had run into a nearby house the officer followed only to
have defendant open the kitchen door and say: "I am the man
you are looking for.");
People v. Mercer, 64 Cal. Rptr. 861 (Ct. App. 2d Dist., Div. I,
1968) (officer pursued and caught up with defendant who was
attempting a jail break, but before officer could say anything,
defendant volunteered: "I did it. No one else was involved.");
In re Orr, 38 Ill. 2d 417, 231 N.E.2d 424 (1967) (assuming
arguendo that 1\1 iranda standards were extended to juveniles by
Gault, those standards not violated where youth, though handcuffed and removed from his grandmother's apartment to a police
squad car by two officers with whom he was seated, stated, without
any questioning, on way to police station that this "has been on my
chest since it happened. I want to get it off.");
Carwell v. State, 2 Md. App. 45, 232 A.2d 903 (Ct. Sp. App.
Md., 1967) (responding to call that two men were breaking a
storehouse window, officers confronted suspect at scene, showed
him their badges and placed him under arrest, whereupon
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suspect "blurted out": "I didn't break the window, the other
boy did it.");
Long v. State, 420 P.2d 158 (Ct. Crim. App. Okla., 1966)
(defendant walked into police station, approached officer on duty
and said, "I have stolen a car.");
Commonwealth v. Eperjesi, 423 Pa. 455, 224 A.2d 216 (1966)
(two days after two small boys were found dead in a refrigerator,
the boys' aunt, who knew investigating officer then visiting
apartment, called him into a room, locked the door and told
him she had closed dgor of refrigerator in which boys had
perished);
Commonwealth v. Boyd, 239 A.2d 853 (Super. Ct. Pa., 1968)
(robbery suspect, approached by police near scene of crime,
volunteered: "I didn't rob that man. He owed me the money.");
State v. Miller, 151 N.W.2d 157 (Sup. Ct. Wise., 1967) (former
law enforcement officer agreed to go down to station; driving
his own car on way down, he made incriminating statements,
without any questions being asked, to officer who rode with him
and whom he knew from former police work together).
In a number of the aforementioned cases, however, the officer
followed up the volunteered statements with a "Why did you
shoot him?" (Intogna, supra; warning required because officer
had drawn gun within 3 feet of defendant who was thus "deprived
of his freedom in a significant way") or a "did what?" (Mercer,
supra; response to this statement also admissible although no
warnings given); or "Did you know the boys were in there?" and
"Why did you do it?" (Eperjesi, supra; answers admissible without warnings). Implicit in Eperjesi seems to be the explicit
reasoning of Mercer: "The question put by the officer clearly
followed a statement initiated and made by defendant." But as
natural and understandable as it is for an officer to keep the
flow of conversation going andjor to "clear up" some points
once the suspect has volunteered an incriminating statement,
such "follow-up" questions may well constitute "interrogation"
within the meaning of Miranda.
Miranda does say at one point that "by custodial interrogation
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we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers aftet
a person has been taken into custody . . . " (384 U.S. at 444;
emphasis added), suggesting that police questioning designed
simply to clarify or amplify a statement volunteered by the
suspect is not "interrogation," but on the same page the opinion
also states that "prior to any questioning, the person must be
warned . . . " (Emphasis added.) Moreover, the Court points
out elsewhere, p. 475-76, that "where in-custody interrogation is
involved, there is no room for the contention that the privilege
is waived if the individual answers some questions or gives some
information on his own prior to invoking his right to remain
silent when interrogated." In context, however, this may only
mean that a defendant who has waived his rights after being
given the requisite warnings is free to revoke that waiver at any
time.
It may be the line should be drawn between police questions
(1) designed to clarify just what the suspect meant to say when
he volunteered the statement (e.g. the officer responding "did
what?" when the defendant volunteered "I did it" in Mercer)
and (2) seeking to enhance defendant's guilt or raise the offense
to a higher degree by, for example, getting at the defendant's
state of mind as seems to have occurred in Intogna ("Why did you
shoot him?") and Eperjesi ("Why did you do it?" and "Did you
know the boys were in there?") and that only the category (2)
"follow-up" questions should be considered "interrogation." In
any event, it is a bit too glib and too loaded to frame the
issue, as Justice Musmanno did for the court in Eperjesi, in terms
of whether an officer should "refuse to listen" to a person at
the scene of the crime he was investigating, 224 A.2d at 220, or
whether Miranda was intended "to restrain a policeman from
listening when statements are voluntarily made," ibid. The officer
in that case did more than just "listen."a
3. When this commentary was already in galleys, the Supreme Court of Ohio
handed down a decision, State v. Perry, 14 Ohio St. 2d 256 (1968) which,
on the basis of Eperjesi-type reasoning criticized in the text, held that
Miranda did not apply to police questions "following up" a volunteered
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Assuming arguendo that sometimes, at least, a "follow-up"
question of a person who has volunteered a statement is "interrogation," the Miranda warnings would still not be required if the
person were not in "custody," as may have been the case in
Eperjesi [See the discussion in the next section].
What of a statement made by defendant in response to a
question asked of another person at the scene? Generally, this
would be a "volunteered" statement, but if the defendant is
already in custody the particular facts of a case may lead to a
different conclusion. In Stone v. United States, 385 F.2d 713
(lOth Cir., 1967) state officers stopped defendant and his woman
companion, then driving the car, and arrested him for his misuse of an expired gasoline credit card at another town. When
first stopped the defendant, referring to his companion, said:
"Let her go; she didn't have anything to do with this; she
doesn't know anything about it." While taking the couple to a
nearby town where the credit card offense occurred, an officer
asked the woman if it was her car [although it turned out later
that the car was stolen, the arresting officers did not know that
then] and the defendant interrupted to say: "No, it's my car.
The car was given to me by my ex-wife in Indianapolis." The
statement. Responding to a complaint about suspicious activities at a
car wash, officers arrived at the scene, observed three men running from
the side of a car wash building, and gave chase.
On being caught, defendant blurted out that he had "never done
anything like this before." An officer then asked him what he had done,
eliciting the admission that defendant and his friends had decided to
break into the car wash. Assuming, arguendo, that the officer was merely
seeking "clarification of [defendant's] ambiguous, but inculpatory, ad·
mission," as the court put it, 14 Ohio St. 2d at 262, when he asked
this question-in light of the immediately preceding events it seems the
officer should have had a pretty good idea of what defendant meant when
he volunteered the statement-the next "follow up" question, how defendant and his friends planned to break into the car wash, certainly
seems to constitute "interrogation" within the meaning of Miranda. In
ruling that Miranda was inapplicable to the instant case, the court noted
that "the officer was not required to prevent [defendant] from continuing
his explanation of his activities at the scene," id. at 262, but it is submitted that the officer did a good deal more than that.
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court took the position that Miranda does not prohibit such
"volunteered" statements, but in light of the fact that defendant
had earlier manifested considerable protectiveness toward his
companion, it is arguable that subsequent questioning of her
about the car in the presence of the defendant was likely, if not
designed, to evoke a statement from him along the lines actually
made. And it is submitted that it is not simply custody plus
"questioning," as such, which calls for the Miranda safeguards
but custody plus police conduct calculated to, expected to, or
likely to, evoke admissions.
Consider People v. Torres, 21 N.Y. 2d 49, 233 N.E. 2d 282
( 1967) where the officer presented himself at defendant's apartment with a search warrant (for possession of policy slips),
exhibited the warrant and explained what it was. Before the
officer said anything else, defendant replied: "The booklets are
in the closet in the room, on top. You are going to find them
anyway." Although the court conceded it was "arguable" that
a defendant who is shown a search warrant covering his apartment and person, is deprived of his freedom in a "significant
way," even in his own home, 233 N. E. 2d at 285, it did not
decide this issue but rather resolved the matter on the ground
that defendant was never "questioned."
Is it not also arguable, however, that exhibiting a search
warrant and explaining its purpose is likely, if not calculated,
to evoke an admission? Most courts would probably hold not,
but suppose the facts are altered. Suppose the police locate and
seize the incriminating physical evidence in the presence of
defendant, who, realizing "the cat is out of the bag," then
makes an incriminating statement? Or suppose, after seizing the
evidence, the police simply stare at the defendant? Or flaunt the
evidence before him? At some jJoint the police conduct must be
regarded as "interrogation" within the meaning of Miranda,
must it not?
In State v. Gallicchio, 51 N . .J. 313, 240 A.2d 166 (1968), three
witnesses viewed-defendant in a line-up. The first picked out
defendant and the second was called to make the identification,
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but before he had a chance to do so, defendant said: "You might
as well go pick me out because everyone else will." As the court
viewed it, defendant "was not being questioned when he made
the statement;" rather "he volunteered it." (240 A.2d at 170)
May it be argued that the way the police conducted the line-up
procedure made it not improbable or unforeseeable that defendant might make an incriminating statement and that therefore, before calling the three witnesses, the police should have
advised defendant that any statement he made in reaction to an
identification could be used against him, etc.? Probably few
courts, if any, would so hold on Gallicchio-type facts, but
Duckett v. State, 240 A.2d 332 (Ct. Spec. App. Md., 1968) dealt
with a line-up or confrontation situation presenting a stronger
case for the applicability of Miranda. There, although the rapekidnapping victim and her husband had already identified defendant on three prior occasions as a participant in the crimes,
the police arranged still another face to face confrontation
between defendant and the victim and her husband, at which
time defendant made an incriminating statement. Since the
court reversed on other grounds, it did not rule on the admissibility of the statement, but it did manifest puzzlement at the
motive and purpose of the police in arranging the fourth confrontation (240 A.2d at 341-42).
Compare Veney v. United States, 344 F.2d 542 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
where Judge Wright, concurring in the result, expressed curiosity
and concern over the fact that since the court, in a 1959 decision,
had held admissible, over a Mallory objection, defendant's statement at a line-up, on the ground that it was made "spontaneously"
and not as a result of interrogation, suggestion or instigation of
the police, '"spontaneous' apologies by defendants [at other
line-ups or confrontations with the complaining witness] have
been offered by the Government and received in evidence . . .
with unusual frequency-usually supported by testimony that the
apologies were not suggested or inspired by the police"- although
in the instant case, at least, one complaining witness had testified
to the contrary. (344 F.2d at 542-43). It seems fairly clear that
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if the statement at the confrontation is suggested or instigated
by the police, as appears to have happened in Veney (where the
police said to the defendant, "Do you want to say anything to
the people [the complaining witnesses]?" and after being met
with silence repeated, "Don't you want to say anything?"), any
resulting "apology" or other incriminating statement should be
inadmissible, absent the Miranda warnings.
What of a statement made by defendant in response to an
accusation by another person at the scene? In State v. Oxentine,
270 N.C. 412, 154 S.E. 2d 529 ( 1967), an officer arrived in
defendant's house, observed deceased lying face down beside
the kitchen table in the midst of beer cans and asked a crying
girl who had shot the deceased. She named the defendant, who,
standing back at the doorway of the other room, responded:
"Yes, I shot him." The court ruled the statement admissible on
two grounds-each of which seems correct-(1) at the time he
made the statement, defendant had not been "taken into custody"
or "deprived of his freedom" and (2) he was not being "questioned" within the intent and meaning of Miranda. Moreover,
it seems unreasonable and unrealistic to expect the officer to
interject the Miranda warning in the course of such rapid-fire,
on-the-scene conversation. However, if, following the bystander's
accusation, the police had taken defendant into custody and
"followed up" the accusation, e.g., "You heard the lady; is she
right?" or "What about it?" the result would seem to be otherwise.
If, after taking defendant into custody, the police had simply
stared at defendant-with the bystander's accusation still "ringing
in the room"-defendant's incriminating statement might also be
inadmissible.
What if defendant makes an incriminating statement while
filling out the forms in connection with the "booking procedure"
or while otherwise being asked his name or address? Although
the question is not entirely free from doubt, it seems that just
as the absence of police questioning, as such, does not always
preclude a finding of "custodial interrogation" so routine police
"questioning" not related to the investigation of the case nor
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designed, expected or likely to elicit information relevant to
guilt may not amount to "custodial interrogation" within the
meaning of Miranda. Reconsider Parson v. United States, discussed supra at p. 352; see Williams v. United States, 391 F.2d 221
(5th Cir. 1968); Clarke v. State, 240 A.2d 291 (Ct. Spec. App. Md.,
1968) (defendant gave name, address and place of employment
in response to booking officer's request for such information, but
if, when asked to supply such routine identification, defendant
had unresponsively made incriminating statements, court's reasoning would have permitted use of such statements absent
Miranda warnings.) To the same effect are pre-Miranda California
cases applying the Escobedo-Dorado rule: People v. Pike, 48 Cal.
Rptr. 575, 578 (Dist. Ct. App., 3d Dist., 1966); People v. Propp,
45 Cal. Rptr. 690, 705 (Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist., 1965).
Police custody, without more, generates certain anxieties and
pressures, but as the Mercer, Miller and Orr cases, discussed
supra at pp. 352-3 illustrate, and as the language of the Miranda
opinion makes fairly clear, "custody," although inherently coercive, is not enough to bring the Miranda warnings into play.
Justice White underscores this point in his Miranda dissent, 384
U.S. at 533:
[T]he [majority] says that the spontaneous product of the
coercion of arrest and detention is still to be deemed voluntary. An accused, arrested on probable cause, may blurt out
a confession which will be admissible despite the fact that
he is alone and in custody, without any showing that he had
any notion of his right to remain silent or of the consequences
of his admission.
When a person in custody is "subjected to interrogation"
about his guilt, additional pressures are created which increase
the need to advise him of his rights because, as the Chief Justice
observed in Miranda, id. at 468:
It is not just the subnormal or woefully ignorant who succumb

to an interrogator's imprecations, whether implied or expressly stated, that the interrogation will continue until a
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confession is obtained or that silence in the face of accusation
is itself damning and will bode ill when presented to a jury
[noting at this point that Lord Devlin has commented that
'there is still a general belief that you must answer all
questions put to you by a policeman, or at least that it will
be the worse for you if you do not.']
It is submitted, however, that absent special circumstances such
questions as "Where do you live?" or "Do you want us to get
you a sandwich?" do not add to the pressures generated by police
custody and therefore unresponsive incriminating statements made
in reply to such questions should be viewed as equivalent to
"blurted out" statements. 4
"General On-the-scene Questioning" or "General
Questioning of Citizens" vs. "Custodial Interrogation"

The Miranda opinion points out, 384 U.S. at 477-78:
Our decision is not intended to hamper the traditional
function of police officers in investigating crime. . .. When
an individual is in custody on probable cause, the police
may, of course, seek out evidence in the field to be used at
trial against him. Such investigation may include inquiry
of persons not under restraint. General on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other general
questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process is not
affected by our holding. It is an act of responsible citizen4. Cf. Rule II of the English Judge's Rules: "As soon as a police officer has
evidence which would afford reasonable grounds for suspecting that a
person has committed an offense, he shall caution that person or cause
him to be cautioned before putting to him any questions or further
questions relating to that offence." (Emphasis added.)
But see Commentary to A.L.I., Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure §A5.08 (Study Draft No. 1, 1968) at pp. 27-28 to the effect that it
is not improper for the police to ask "routine questions unrelated to the
investigation of the case," but "if such non-investigative questioning does
happen to produce an incriminatory statement, it must be excluded from
evidence unless the proper warnings were issued and a valid waiver was
obtained."
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ship for individuals to give whatever information they may
have to aid in law enforcement. In such situations the
compelling atmosphere inherent in the process of in-custody
interrogation is not necessarily present [noting, at this point,
p. 478 n. 46, the observation of a Scottish court that modern
police interrogation practices 'create a situation very unfavourable to the suspect,' unlike former times, when questioning 'would be conducted by police officers visiting the
house or place of business of the suspect and there questioning
him, probably in the presence of a relation or friend.']
(Emphasis added.)
Typical of cases finding "general questioning of citizens in
the fact-finding process" are:
United States v. Messina, 388 F.2d 393 (2d Cir., 1968) (alternative holdings that (1) warnings given were adequate under
Miranda and (2) even if not, defendant was "not 'in custody'indeed, the interviews were held on a park bench and in a
Schrafft's restaurant;" but this does not necessarily render Miranda
applicable and a more detailed description of circumstances would
seem in order);
United States v. Essex, 275 F. Supp. 393, 397-98 (E.D. Tenn.,
1967) (defendant invited two federal agents into her living room,
pointing out that "she had been expecting a visit from the FBI";
no charge had been made against her and no indictment returned
against her until a year after this "investigative interview");
Tillery v. State, 238 A.2d 125 (Ct. Sp. App. Md., 1968) unaware
that defendant had been shot attempting a robbery and not
suspecting him of any crime, officer questioned defendant in
hospital merely as a victim of a shooting);
People v. Gilbert, 8 Mich. App. 393, 154 N.W. 2d 800, 801
(Ct. App. Mich., 1967) (defendant questioned about fatal accident
in which he was involved as "he freely walked about the hospital
corridors and emergency room;" he was "in no way isolated for
questioning and the period of interrogation was of short duration;" although the facts given seem to support result, court also
suggests Miranda should be limited to facts of cases before
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Supreme Court when it wrote the opinion, e.g., persons under
"formal arrest" and subjected to "general atmosphere of psychological compulsion," which seems to be unduly restrictive reading
of Miranda);
Commonwealth v. Barclay, 240 A.2d 838 (Super. Ct. Pa., 1968)
(officer interviewed defendant in his living room, in presence of
both his wife and father, informing him that he had a complaint
that defendant was involved in a "drag race;" Hoffman, J.,
dissents, maintaining that officer had "focused" on defendant
by the time he went to his home and-what this writer believes
is more to the point-that defendant "knew immediately he was
the focal point of the investigation.")
What determines whether a person being questioned is "in
custody"? (1) The subjective intention of the questioning officer
to hold the person or to arrest him? (2) The degree to which the
investigation has "focused" on the person or, a variation of the
same approach, whether or not the police have "probable cause"
to arrest the person? (3) The subjective belief of the person that
he is significantly deprived of his freedom? (4) The belief of the
person, as "a reasonable man," that his freedom is significantly
impaired? It is submitted that approach (4) should be controlling.

People v. Glover, 52 Misc., 2d 425, 276 N. Y. S. 2d 461 (Sup.
Ct. Bx. Cy., 1966) and People v. Allen, 50 Misc. 2d 897, 272
N. Y. S. 2d 249 (Sup. Ct. Kings Cy., 1966), rev'd mem. (3-2),
28 App. Div. 2d 724, 281 N. Y. S. 2d 602 (2d Dep't, 1967) take
the view, erroneously, it is submitted, that "custodial interrogation" turns on whether the police have probable cause to arrest
the person being questioned or whether their suspicion has
"focused" on him. At one point, Justice Chimera states flatly
in Glover, 276 N.Y. S. 2d at 466: "[W]hatever else Miranda may
have intended 'custody' to mean, this much is apparent-police
questioning of a person wherever detained, upon whom suspicion
has already focused, appears ruled to be 'custodial interrogation.' "
In the much-discussed Allen case, Justice Sobel also advances the
view that the subjective intention of the officer to hold or to
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arrest the person being questioned constitutes an independent
basis for finding that "custodial questioning" is taking place.
In Allen, police officers accompanied by the complaining witness (defendant's mother-in-law, who claimed he had raped her)
and the complaining witness' paramour, went to defendant's
house and asked the defendant in the presence of his wife (the
alleged victim's daughter) whether he had committed the rape.
Justice Sobel found that defendant was "in custody" at the time
this question was asked, because the officers had admitted that
they went to defendant's house "for the purpose of making an
arrest" and because they would not have permitted the defendant
to leave before questioning him, 50 Misc. 2d at 899, 272 N .Y.S.
2d at 251.
Justice Sobel was quite correct when he pointed out that "it
does not matter that the question was asked in the defendant's
home upon 'first' custody rather than in the police station," but
he was in error, it is submitted, when he deemed it conclusive
that "quite obviously the defendant in the instant case was 'on
target' and was 'not free to go.' " 50 Misc. 2d at 900, 272 N .Y.S.
2d at 252.
Justice Sobel's views on this point have been spelled out in
his valuable monograph, THE NEw CoNFESSION STANDARDS 60-61
(1966):
Whether his judgment was right or wrong, if [the police
officer's] subjective intention was to hold the person, then
that particular person was not 'free to go.' He was in 'custody.'
[citing the Allen case] In this same regard, the belief of the
person detained that he was not 'free to go' is of no consequence. The issue is not 'coercion.' Only the fact of 'custody'
is of consequence. If he was in fact 'free to go,' it should
not matter that subjectively he believed he was not. One
who is 'free to go' is not under legal 'compulsion.' His
answers may be used against him.
The 'objective test' is required when the police officer
testifies at the admissibility hearings that the person detained
was in fact 'free to go.' In such a situation, the officer may
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honestly believe that the person detained was 'free to go.'
His belief is relevant but not by any means controlling.
The prime inquiry is into the existence of probable cause.
If indeed the police officer had probable cause to arrest, his
protestations that the person detained was 'free to go' must
be ignored. It must be presumed that a police officer will do
his duty; if he has probable cause, he will arrest. The
existence of probable cause establishes 'custody.'
As already indicated in the discussion of "CusTODY" vs. "Focus,"
supra, p. 338-50, this writer is of the view (and believes Hoffa and
Osborn make clear) that neither the intent to arrest, nor the
existence of probable cause, nor the fact that defendant is "on
target" establishes "custody" within the meaning of Miranda.
Justice Sobel's views to the contrary notwithstanding, the "fact
of custody" cannot be established without regard to the impressions or beliefs of the person being questioned. If the defendant does feel ''free to go" then regardless of the uncommunicated intent of the officers or their possession of "probable
cause" to arrest, he is not "in custody;" the pressures and anxieties
generated by custodial interrogation are not operating and thus
there is no need to give the neutralizing, offsetting Miranda
warnings.
Since the trial in Commonwealth v. jefferson, 423 Pa. 541,
226 A.2d 765 (1967) took place more than a year prior to
Miranda, that landmark decision was not applicable, but the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, per Eagen, J., took footnote 4 in
the Miranda opinion, discussed supra at p. 339, too seriously, and
seemed to say by way of dictum that once the investigation had
"begun to focus" on defendant "as the accused she was 'in
custody,'" apparently within the meaning of Miranda. (226 A.2d
at 768).
Investigating a stabbing, an officer went to a hospital and
asked "all those present in the accident ward" (including defendant, who had a towel over her forehead and left eye) and
"no one in particular": "What happened?" Defendant made an
incriminating statement in reply. It seems clear that neither
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under Escobedo nor Miranda did this question have to be preceded by warnings. This was a general inquiry into an unsolved
crime within the meaning of Escobedo and "general questioning
of citizens in the fact-finding process" within the meaning of
Miranda.
A second officer arrived at the hospital, however, and after a
"briefing" by the first officer, the newly arrived officer entered
the ward to ask: "Who did the stabbing?" Again, defendant made
an incriminating statement in reply. But at this point, although
the Jefferson opinion indicates otherwise, the rationales of
Escobedo and Miranda lead to different results. The questioning
situation had changed from a general inquiry "to one which
focused on a particular suspect for the purpose of eliciting a
question," 226 A.2d at 768, but it seems that defendant was not
yet "in custody." The court suggested, however, that she was, ibid:
"[A]fter [defendant's] admissions to [the first officer], the investigation had certainly begun to focus on her as the accused; and,
she was certainly not free to leave and [was] at least technically
'in custody.' "
It is unclear whether the fact that the investigation had
"begun to focus" on defendant and the fact that she was not
"free to leave" were alternative grounds for concluding that she
was in custody, but even in combination, for reasons set forth
above, these factors would not seem to amount to "custody"
within the meaning of Miranda.
People v. Rodney P. (Anonymous), 21 N.Y. 2d 1, 233 N.E. 2d
255 (1967) explicitly rejects the reasoning in Jefferson, supra,
and, by implication, the reasoning in Allen and Glover as well,
but, for reasons discussed below, seems to give Miranda an unduly
restrictive reading.
In Rodney P., one youth, arrested in connection with a car
theft, admitted his involvement and identified defendant as his
accomplice. A detective went to the vicinity of defendant's. home,
asked which of the three youths standing outside was defendant
and when the defendant, a 16 year-old, identified himself, the
detective asked the other two youths to leave, which they did.
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After questioning defendant for some three or four minutes about
being with the youth who had already admitted his involvement
in the theft (although apparently this was not communicated to,
defendant), defendant also admitted his involvement.
A 5-2 majority of the New York Court of Appeals, per Keating,
J ., held that defendant was not subjected to "custodial interrogation," and therefore the Miranda warnings need not have
been given, relying heavily on People v. Arnold, 58 Cal. Rptr.
115, 120, 426 P.2d 515, 520 (1967) ("custody occurs if the suspect
is physically deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way or is led to believe) as a reasonable person, that he is so
deprived") (emphasis added) and People v. Hazel, 60 Cal. Rptr,
437 (Ct. App. lst Dist., Div. I, 1967) (to the same effect). Wrote
Judge Keating, 233 N.E. at 260-61:
This [the test applied by the California courts] is the test
which we hold to be the most reasonable. It gives effect to
the purpose of the Miranda rules; it is not solely dependent
either on the self-serving declarations of the police officers
or the defendant nor does it place upon the police the burden
of anticipating the frailties or idiosyncracies of every person
whom they question . . . . Applying the rule to the facts in
the case at bar, we conclude that the .Miranda warnings need
not have been given. The police drove up to the front of the
defendant's home, a private dwelling. The defendant and two
friends were on the side steps of the house. One of the
detectives got out of the car, approached the defendant and,
quite properly, asked to speak to him privately regarding a
matter which might prove to be embarrassing. The defendant
was not told that he was under arrest when he responded
to the questions outside his home-'in [his own] backyard'
to use his counsel's words-nor was he physically restrained in
any way. The fact that he might have been restrained, had
he attempted to leave, is not controlling .... Nor can it be
said that the defendant was led 'as a reasonable person' to
believe that his freedom was restrained in any significant way.
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There is no evidence that the police officer had his gun
drawn 5 • • • or that the defendant knew or was advised that
his accomplice was already in custody and had implicated
him .... '[T]he conversation took ... [n]o more than three
or four minutes.'
This kind of questioning is little different from routine
police investigation of crimes or suspicious conduct at a
person's home, his place of business or on the street-the kind
of questioning which has uniformly held not to require the
Miranda warnings. . . .
The Rodney P. majority also dwelt on the fact that Miranda
had stressed that even the modern police interrogation practice
"is predicated upon psychological coercion," 233 N .E. 2d at 257;
that in all the cases before the Court in Miranda the defendant
had been detained and interrogated in police stations, in an
"atmosphere" which "carries its own badge of intimidation,"
ibid.; criticized the jefferson case because its reasoning "overlooks
the language and purpose of the Miranda warnings which is to
protect the individual's freedom of choice-to answer or not
answer-in situations which are inherently coercive," id. at 259;
maintained that the determination of "custodial interrogation"
"must ... be based upon a careful examination of the holding
of Miranda, the purpose of the Supreme Court in requiring the
four-fold warning and the evil which the Court resolved to
eradicate," id. at 257; and concluded, id. at 261:
[W]e believe that, in prefacing the word 'restraint' with the
adjective 'significant,' the Supreme Court intended that the
warnings be given when the questioning takes place under
5. In People v. Shivers, 21 N.Y. 2d ll8, 233 N.E. 2d 836 (1967), decided one
month after Rodney P., a 4-3 majority of the New York Court of Appeals,
per Fuld, C.J., held that even brief questioning of a suspect at the scene
by an officer who has drawn his gun is "custodial interrogation," agreeing
with the dissent below that "a drawn and pointed revolver has no
ambiguity, and its compulsion is manifest. The threat is direct and the
need to comply immediate." To similar effect is State v. Intogna, 101
Ariz. 275, 419 P.2d 59 (1966). But cf. Hill v. State, discussed infra, p. 374.
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circumstances which are likely to affect substantially the
individual's 'will to resist and compel him to speak where
he would not otherwise do so freely.' ... Such circumstances
were not present here.
Burke, J., joined by Fuld, C.J., dissented, contending (233
N.E. 2d at 262-63):
The majority opinion has construed 'the language and
purpose of * * * Miranda' to be the protection of the
individual's freedom of choice-to answer or not answerin situations which are inherently coercive. To reduce
Miranda to situations where a person feels compelled to
respond to an inquiry is, in my opinion, an illogical distortion
of the term 'freedom of action.' The 'purpose' behind
Miranda notwithstanding, 'freedom of action' is a· concept
logically independent of 'compulsion to speak.' The Supreme
Court, for whatever its reasons, declared that these four-fold
warnings must be given when a suspect's freedom of action
is 'significantly' impaired. This is all we are called upon to
decide here. It is not our task under Miranda to consider
whether in laying down this rule the Supreme Court may
have in fact laid down a rule broader than was necessary to
achieve the purposes for which it was formulated. Our
task is only to apply that rule.
The majority itself proposes a rule which I believe accords
with the dictates of Miranda, namely, in requiring that the
warnings be given whenever a suspect either is in fact or
reasonably believes himself to be deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way. In applying this rule to the
case at bar, however, the majority introduces the extraneous
consideration of whether or not there were, in addition,
elements of compulsion to answer the arresting officer's
questions. The latter element is not only irrelevant to a
determination of whether the Miranda warnings were required, its application generally will require our courts and
law enforcement officials to become involved in every case
such as this in the extremely difficult process of assessing
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whether or not the coercive aspects of the situation were such
as to compel the suspect to answer the questions of an
arresting officer, not merely whether or not a reasonable man
would have felt his freedom of action significantly impaired.
Rejecting this concept of 'purpose' and accepting for the
moment the test proposed by the majority, I am of the
opinion that the defendant was here deprived of his freedom
of action in a significant way at the time that he made these
oral admi~sions. When the detective approached him, it is
clear that defendant was the only suspect as far as a possible
accomplice was concerned. The 'fact-finding' stage had been
concluded. The police investigation had reached the 'accusatorial stage.' Immediately following his meeting with the
defendant, the detective directed his two friends to leave
them alone. His initial inquiry was whether Rodney P.
knew Daniel W., the youth who was arrested and who had
implicated him. After an affirmative response, the detective
pressed the defendant and succeeded in eliciting the oral
admission. This statement strikes me as an admission made
by a suspect under circumstances which violate the rule laid
down in Miranda. I do not understand how any conclusion
can be reached other than that it was reasonable for this
16-year old youth, who had been isolated from his companions and questioned specifically with regard to the commission of a crime, to believe that he would be detained
until the question was answered to the satisfaction of the
detective. This conclusion is in accord with the Supreme
Court's analysis in Miranda. Yet the majority, by applying
their test, does not arrive at this result.

*

*

*

In formulating a purposive interpretation of Miranda, I
am in accord with the majority that a subjective approach
hinging upon the particular defendant's analysis of a situation would impose an unreasonable burden upon law enforcement agencies, requiring them to anticipate a person's
'frailties or idiosyncrasies.' However, I disagree with their
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rejection of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's application
of Miranda in Commonwealth v. Jefferson. . . . There,
the defendant was truly a suspect in technical custody.
Miranda, as I view it requires an answer to the hypothetical
'If the person had remained silent or expressly refused to
answer under privilege of self-incrimination, would the
police have permitted him to leave?'
(1) Insofar as Judge Burke criticizes the Rodney P. majority
for indicating that "custodial interrogation" might be limited
to "inherently coercive" circumstances or to those situations
which are likely to affect substantially the individual's "will to
resist," the dissenting opinion's criticism is well taken. A person
significantly deprived of his freedom by an officer who then
asks him questions relating to the crime being investigated is
entitled to the Miranda warnings without regard to whether his
plight amounts to, or approaches, the pressures operating on the
defendants in the 1\.1 iranda cases or those working on one being
subjected to the psychological coercion recommended in police
interrogation manuals. See the discussion of PoLICE STATION INTERROGATION VS. "FIELD INTERROGATION," supra at 336-7. To put
it another way, when a suspect, who may reasonably conclude
that his freedom has been significantly restrained by a police
officer, is questioned about his guilt by the officer, it must be
conclusively presumed that his "will to resist" has been substantially affected.
(2) Insofar as Judge Burke argues that (a) once the police
investigation has "focused on" a suspect or reached the "accusatorial stage" or (b) once the police have made the decision,
whether or not communicated, not to let the suspect go, the
suspect is "in custody," it is submitted, for the reasons advanced
in the discussion of Allen, Glover and Jefferson, supra, that he is
in error.
(3) Whether or not the suspect in Rodney P. could and did
reasonably conclude that his liberty was significantly restrained,
i.e., that he would not be free to leave unless and until he did
answer questions to the satisfaction of the detective, as dissenting
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.Judge Burke believes, is unclear. (The defendant did not testify
at the suppression hearing.) The awareness of the person being
questioned by an officer that he has become the "focal point"
of the investigation, or that the police already have ample cause
to arrest him, may well lead him to conclude, as a reasonable
person, that he is not free to leave, that he has been significantly
deprived of his freedom, but the Rodney P. majority does not focus
on this issue, nor is this point addressed in the Allen, Glover and
jefferson cases.
Windsor v. United States, 389 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1968) also
fails to consider the extei'it to which defendant realized that the
investigation had focused on him, deeming it controlling that
federal agents must have regarded him the "focal point." The
salient facts in Windsor are as follows: Earlier in the day,
defendant and his companion had been stopped in an automobile
by local police for a traffic violation. When the companion failed
to prove ownership of the vehicle, the local police contacted
the FBI. Defendant's companion admitted to federal agents that
the car was stolen and that he and defendant had driven it
across state lines. The FBI agents then went to defendant's motel,
talked to some persons at the motel for "background information"
and upon entering the room belonging to these persons, in
the presence of defendant, spotted and seized a gun which
defendant identified as his. The agents then told defendant they
had the key to the motel room he and his companion shared and
asked defendant to accompany him to this room, which he did.
Before questioning defendant, one agent then told defendant,
inter alia, that he was not under arrest and was not being detained
in any way and that he could terminate the interview at any
time.
Nevertheless the court ruled inadmissible the incriminating
statements obtained from defendant in the motel room absent
the full Miranda warning, 389 F.2d at 535:
The focus of the investigation was clearly and unmistakably
upon [defendant] while he was being interrogated. In effect
he was already being detained and in custody or being
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deprived of his freedom in a significant way .... [Defendant's
companion] had already given the agents sufficient evidence
for them to conclude that [defendant] was also involved in
the inter-state transportation of the stolen car. There was,
therefore, probable cause to arrest him. . . . [Defendant]
was definitely the central figure in their investigation [and
should have been given the full Miranda warning before
the motel room questioning began].
For reasons already discussed at length, the court's test, although responsive to Escobedo, seems unresponsive to Miranda.
However, the court might have reached the same result by a
different route. Although these aspects of the case are not clear,
because the court doesn't address itself to them, defendant
probably realized that his companion had already told the
federal agents of their involvement in the crime, and had given
the agents the key to their room. If so, then despite the agent's
words to the contrary, defendant might reasonably have concluded that being the "central figure" in the case he really
wasn't "free to go"-at least not very far. The seizure of de·
fendant's gun a short time earlier might reasonably be expected
to contribute to this conclusion.
The "focus" test was also applied in People v. Ceccone, 67 Cal.
Rptr. 499 (Ct. App. 2d Dist., Div. 3, 1968). After stopping
defendant for a traffic violation and in the course of inquiring
about defendant's proof of ownership of the car, the officer
spotted on the floor of the car capsules, which appeared to him
to contain dexedrine, and a wax paper bag, which, when the
officer picked it up and opened it, appeared to him to contain
marijuana. The officer then showed defendant the capsules and
the contents of the bag, asking him whether he knew what they
were. Defendant denied knowing what the capsules were, but
admitted that the bag contained marijuana.
The court threw out this incriminating statement because the
investigation had focused upon defendant, the officer had ample
cause to arrest him for narcotics violations (and driving a stolen
vehicle) and could not be expected to permit him to leave.
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Thus, a permissible general on-the-scene questioning had become
"a custodial interrogation." (67 Cal. Rptr. at 503.) This approach
has already been criticized at length. The court went on to say,
and it is submitted that it was on sounder ground when
it did, that at the point when defendant was asked what the bag
contained, "the prior questioning could have led defendant, as
a reasonable person, to believe that he was not free to depart.
Therefore, he was in custody and should have been warned of his
rights before being questioned." (Ibid.)
Although the "general on-the-scene questioning" and "general
questioning of citizens" language allows the state and lower
federal courts a considerable amount of maneuverability in
applying 1\firanda to particular fact situations, some cases seem
to have taken excessive liberties with these concepts:
United States v. Delamarra, 275 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C., 1967)
(defendant building custodian went to university to pick up his
check when told to report to university safety and security
officer, in charge of guards, in guard's briefing room; in this
room both security officer and city police sergeant questioned
him about recent theft from university safe; when university
official left room, sergeant continued to question defendant and
when latter implicated a guard, sergeant asked official to return
and hear what defendant had said; when official found discrepancies in the accusation, defendant then made incriminating
statements; court's view that questioning was "only . . . part
of a general investigation," 275 F. Supp. at 4, seems strained,
and its observation that "there is no need for Miranda warnings
to be given to all who choose to cooj;erate with law enforcement
officers in furtherance of a still general investigation," ibid.
(emphasis added), seems far removed from reality of instant
case; certainly at point when defendant was asked about discrepancies in his story, if not earlier, he must have realized he
was in deep trouble and hardly free to leave);
Duffy v. State, 243 Md. 425, 221 A.2d 653 (Court of Appeals,
1966) (acting on information supplied by two youths who
admitted participating in a robbery and stabbing, two officers
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went to a bedroom where defendant was sleeping, seized a knife
under the mattress of defendant's bed, then aroused defendant,
greeting him with the query, "Is this the knife you used in the
fight?"-it turned out that it was-eliciting incriminating statement from defendant; court views Escobedo and Miranda inapplicable to confession gleaned from a suspect "merely accosted
by the police," 221 A.2d at 656; but this seems an unrealistic,
euphemistic way of describing circumstances; defendant must
have concluded-certainly a reasonable man would have-on being
awakened by uniformed officers, one of whom was flaunting the
weapon used in the crime, and asking him a pointed question,
that officers had a great deal "on him" and that his liberty was
significantly curtailed);
Hill v. State, 420 S.W. 2d 408 (Ct. Crim. App. Texas, 1967)
(after spotting defendant crawling out of bushes covering the
broken window of an office building which he had previously
observed, officer drew his revolver, bringing defendant to an
abrupt halt and leading him to holler, "don't shoot, don't shoot;"
upon being handcuffed, defendant, "responding to the officer's
questions, denied having a weapon and related that 'just one'
more man was in the building," 420 S.W. 2d at 409; but court
holds statements admissible, in absence of .Miranda warnings,
with cryptic comment that 1\lliranda does not apply to "res gestae
statements such as the one made under the circumstances here
described," id. at 411; but it is not apparent why not);
The difficulties involved in determining precisely at what
point "on-the-scene" or "general" questioning becomes "custodial interrogation" are well illustrated by two very recent
federal appellate decisions: Allen v. United States, 390 F.2d 476
(D.C. Cir., 1968) and United States v. Gibso11, 392 F.2d 373
(4th Cir., 1968).
In Allen, in the early hours of the morning, an officer stopped
a car being driven at "an extremely slow speed with headlights
off," intending to issue a traffic citation. The officer asked defendant to prodtn:e his driver's permit and automobile registration, noticing another man (.Jeffries) in the car, "slumped over
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in the right rear seat, whose 'face was. beyond recognition,'
bleeding profusely about the head." Defendant replied he did not
have a permit or registration. The officer then asked defendant
who owned the car, where it came from and where he had
gotten it, to all of which defendant answered that he did not
know.
The officer then asked the injured man in the rear seat whether
he owned the car (the reply was mumbled and unintelligible) and
whether he had been beaten, and if so, by whom. Again, the
response was an unintelligible mumble, but this time it was
accompanied by a gesture-the injured man, whom the officer
knew had been drinking, raised his hand and pointed to defendant. The officer then turned to defendant and asked him
whether he had beaten Jeffries. Defendant replied in the affirmative.
Judge Leventhal's comments, in the course of ruling that the
Miranda warnings need not have been given under the circumstances, are quite sound in the abstract and as applied to police
questioning of defendant about his driver's permit and car
registration, but, it is submitted, questionable as applied to the
admissibility of defendant's statement that he had beaten Jeffries.
Observed .Judge Leventhal (390 F.2d at 478-79):
Whether police have left the channel of 'investigation'
and run onto the shoals of 'custodial interrogation' cannot
be determined by reference to some chart clearly designating
the various lights, bells, buoys and other channel markers.
Nor is it possible or desirable to simplify the matter by
saying that whenever any officer is prepared to detain an
individual he may not ask any questions. Such a rule would
venerate form over the substance of sound relations between
police and citizens in a large community. \Ve think the
relative routineness of an inquiry is a material indicator
that the police are still in a state of investigation. The police
talk to too many people in the course of a day to make
warnings compulsory every time they inquire into a situation.
Such a requirement would hamper and perhaps demean
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routine police investigation. Indeed excessive admonitions
are likely to make cooperative and law-abiding citizens
anxious and fearful out of proportion to the need for
admonitions in advising prime suspects of their rights.
Miranda specifically permits general on-the-street investigation of citizens not under restraint . . . . But obviously
citizens are subject to some detention even in that kind of
investigation. We think some inquiry can be made as part of
an investigation notwithstanding limited and brief restraints
by the police in their effort to screen crimes from relatively
routine mishaps. It is not uncommon for citizens to forget
their permits and registration cards. That this mishap
produces incidental detention and restraint while the possibility of a stolen car is checked out, perhaps so brief as to
be virtually unappreciated by the person involved, does not
produce the kind of custodial situation contemplated by
the Miranda doctrine.
The question as to the assault on Jeffries is more difficult.
Appellant's counsel artfully dramatizes the situation by
saying that Jeffries had already literally pointed the finger
at appellant. In context, however, what we see is an officer
taking account of a bleeding man. He asks, who beat you?and gets only a mumble, for the man is drunk. The officer
could not know what the beaten man was trying to indicate,
or whether he was in a position to make or report any
observation. What did the man mean by his finger-that
appellant hit him? That appellant knew who did? The
police officer thought it was unusual that a man was lying
on the right rear seat. But what did it mean? Was the
driver taking the man for a hostile ride? Or to the hospital?
An assault is a misdemeanor, and not every fracas is an
assault. The courts must look to the essence of the situation
and it seems to us clear that the essence here was not an
officer staging an interrogation that had focused on a subject
but an officer reacting to a street scene and trying to run
down the facts. There were two men before him, one reflect-
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ing signs of a possible assault, and he asked first one and
then the other, what happened? We think that when the
officer asked appellant if he had beaten Jeffries, he had not
yet made a determination to arrest for assault but was rather
engaged in sorting out the facts in a type of street investigation. Miranda did not require the officer to preface with
the several warnings therein outlined the questions put to
this appellant.
With all deference, by the time the officer asked defendant
whether he had beaten Jeffries, defendant must have concludedcertainly a reasonable man would have-that he was not free
to go, that his liberty was significantly restrained. A person caught
at 3:30 a.m. driving at an extremely slow speed with his headlights off [doesn't this eliminate the possibility that he was taking
Jeffries to the hospital?] with a back-seat passenger whose face
is battered "beyond recognition" is in a "bad spot." Defendant
must have known this and must have realized that the officer knew
it, too. Although Jeffries' gesture was not unambiguous, his
raising his hand and pointing to defendant was hardly calculated
to relieve any of "the pressure" defendant must have been feeling.
Moreover, after failing to produce either a driver's permit
or registration, and after failing to explain who owned the car,
where it came from and where he had gotten it (it turned out
defendant was driving a stolen car), defendant must have realized
that the officer would not let him go without checking out the
ownership of the car. (As Mathis, discussed supra at p. 337-8, a
case handed down by the United States Supreme Court several
months after the instant case was decided, makes plain, a person
"in custody" in connection with one offense may not be questioned about an entirely separate offense without being given
the Miranda warnings.)
Although this writer believes that defendant Allen was being
subjected to "custodial interrogation" within the meaning of
Miranda he shares Judge Leventhal's view that it is a difficult
case. Indeed, he feels obliged to point out that when he asked
half a dozen of his colleagues how they would have decided the
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case, all but one replied that asking the defendant whether he
had beaten Jeffries was so "natural," "understandable" and
"spontaneous" under the circumstances that the Miranda warning
need not have been given. 6
United States v. Gibson is another close case, but one which
probably falls beyond the pale of Miranda, as the court held.
West Virginia state troopers began a hunt for a stolen car bearing
Indiana license plates and found it outside a beer tavern. Entering
the tavern and finding defendant seated at a table, one trooper
asked defendant to step outside and engaged him in a brief
conversation on the sidewalk about where he lived (Indiana)
and whether he owned a car (defendant denied that he did).
When the trooper next asked him, "Do you own this white car
sitting here?'' defendant at first said he did not but almost
6. Compare Schnepp v. State, 437 P.2d 84 (Sup. Ct. Nev., 1968)-a case
which this writer finds even more troublesome-where a TV set in the
front seat, rather than a bloody passenger in the rear, proved defendant's
undoing. Investigating the reported burglary of a television set from an
unoccupied motel room, an officer stopped defendant's car, mo' mg slowly
within a half block of the motel, and the only car on the street. The
defendant came running back to the police car, but the officer worked
his way up to defendant's car to get a better look and observed a television
set partially covered with a sweater on the front seat. The officer then
asked defendant two questions, to both of which he replied, "I don't
know:" (1) to whom did the television set belong; and (2) how did it
get into the car? Although the court views both questions as proper
"pre-custody" "investigative" inquiries, it seems fairly clear that once
defendant gave an incriminating "I don't know" to the first question,
the second one should not have been asked without the Miranda warning.
The more difficult and more fundamental issue, however, is whether the
first question should have been asked without regard to Miranda. Arguably, defendant, having unsuccessfully tried to keep the officer away from
the car, may have reasonably concluded, once he realized the officer had
spotted the TV set, that he was "caught red-handed" and thus significantly deprived of his liberty. But how much did defendant know the
officer knew? For example, did the officer just happen to be passing by
or was he responding to a reported burglary? Looking at it from the
suspect's point of view (the officer had certainly "focused" on Schnepp,
but this writer has maintained at length that the "focus" test is no longer
controlling), the Schnepp facts seem to merit the "sorting out the facts
in a type of street investigation" characterization somewhat more than
do the Allen facts.
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immediately changed his tune: "Well, there's no use to lie to you.
This is my car."
Although, in ruling the statement admissible without the
Miranda warnings, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, per Sobeloff, J., suggests at one point that Miranda
should be confined to situations akin to incommunicado, menacing station-house interrogation, 392 F .2d at 37 5-76 (for the
view that this is an unduly restrictive reading see the discussion
at p. 336-7 supra), and arguably, once the trooper pointed to the
stolen car, defendant might have reasonably concluded that the
trooper already knew too much about the case to let him go,
the court's contrary conclusion does not seem unwarranted, id.
at 376:
[A]t the time of the conversation, [defendant] was not in
custody or significantly restrained, or in any other way
deprived of his free will. [The trooper] simply asked [him]
to step to the sidewalk, and pointing to the car parked in
front of the premises, asked him if it was his. At first denying
ownership, [defendant] quickly reversed course and, without
any pressure from the officer, voluntarily produced the document intended to prove his ownership. It was at this point
that [the trooper] noticed the alterations which led him to
check further . . .
... Significant in the instant case are the short duration of
the questioning, which lasted no more than a few minutes;
the very casual, reasonable and routine manner in which
it was conducted; and the absence of any apparent purpose
either to force or to trick the suspect into an admission of
guilt.
Just as a situation which begins by a defendant "volunteering"
statements may quickly be transformed into one where the
"volunteer" is being "interrogated," as when the officer "followsup" the initial statement with questions designed to enhance the
person's guilt, such as by getting at the defendant's "state of
mind" at the time he committed the act, see the discussion under
"VouJ:-.oTEERED" STATEl\IENTS vs. STATEMENTS MADE IN REsPONSE

380 / "C U S T 0 D I A L

I N T E R R 0 G A T I 0 N"

To "INTERROGATION," supra p. 380, so "general on-the-scene
questioning" or "general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding
process" may quickly be converted into "custodial interrogation,"
as when a "neutral inquiry" such as "What happened?" or "What's
the trouble here?" draws an incriminating statement and the
officer follows it up by pressing for details. Because they seem
to overlook this point, the following cases, it is submitted,
wrongly decided the "custodial interrogation" issue:
State v. Taylor, 437 P.2d 853 (Sup. Ct. Ore., 1968) (defendant
collided with another car within earshot of an officer who
immediately drove to the scene; assuming arguendo that the
first few questions were properly asked without the Miranda
warning-whether it was defendant's car (yes) and whether he was
driving it (yes)-it is questionable whether the officer should
have then asked him whether he had been drinking (yes)-and
after receiving an affirmative answer it seems fairly clear that
the officer should not have pressed him further, as he did, without
giving him the Miranda warnings, by asking him what he had
been drinking (whiskey and beer), how much he had been
drinking (four to five beers and a couple of whiskies), where
he had been drinking, whether he was taking insulin, etc.;
but the court regards all these questions as "general on-the-scene
questioning");
State v. Meadows, 272 N.C. 327, 158 S.E. 2d 638, 643, 645
( 1968) (on receiving a call that a shooting had occurred at a
certain address, police proceeded to investigate; finding, upon
arrival, a man bleeding from a neck wound in defendant's yard,
police asked defendant, in the presence of several people, what
had happened; after defendant replied, "I shot him," the police
then asked him why he had done so and also questioned him
about the weapon he had used; court views entire situation as
"a general investigation by police officers when called to the
scene of a shooting" which is "a far cry from the 'in-custody
interrogation' condemned in Miranda");
Tate v. State, 413 S.W. 2d 366, 369 (Sup. Ct. Tenn., 1967) (on
arriving at defendant's place of business minutes after shooting
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occurred, officers asked a group of people who had done the
shooting and defendant replied that he had, whereupon the
police asked him "why" and, in response, defendant furnished
a motive; although Miranda not applicable because of early date
of trial, court rules situation beyond scope of Escobedo and,
by implication, Miranda, as well, by characterizing questioning
at scene, including the "why" as "about as much of a general
inquiry as one would ever find").
Although "follow-up" questions are natural and understandable in a rapid-fire situation, it is hard to believe that when
the Supreme Court noted that "general on-the-scene questioning"
or "general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process"
was unaffected by Miranda that it meant to say that a person who
has already admitted that he shot someone may be questioned
further in the absence of the Miranda warnings. 7 Nor is it easy
to see how a person who responds to further questioning at this
point may be viewed as merely engaging in "an act of responsible
citizenship" by giving "whatever information [heJ may have to
aid in law enforcement," to quote from the sentence in the
Miranda opinion immediately following-and apparently ilium7. Although prima facie an officer asking, "What's the trouble?" upon arriving
at the scene of a reported crime would seem to be engaged in "general
on-the-scene questioning," an earlier admission to the authorities may
convert this prima facie "neutral inquiry" into "custodial interrogation."
Consider State v. Billings, 436 P.2d 212 (Sup. Ct. Nev., 1968): A police
department radio dispatcher received a telephone request for police aid.
When the dispatcher asked, "What's the trouble?" defendant replied, "I
just killed my wife." In response to "Who's calling, please?" defendant
then gave his right name. (These follow-up questions do not constitute
"custodial interrogation" because a person telephoning the police is
plainly not in custody.") On arriving at defendant's home, an officer
asked, "What's the trouble, Russ?" whereupon defendant made further
incriminating statements-which the court categorized as "volunteered" or,
alternatively, in response to general on-the-scene questioning. But defendant probably realized-surely a reasonable man would have-that since
the dispatcher had passed on his request for police assistance the statement
"I just killed my wife" must have been passed on, too, and that
therefore the officer who proceeded to his home and asked him what
the trouble was already knew that he had shot his wife.
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inating-the language about "general on-the-scene questioning."
(See p. 360-l supra). Once a member of a group at the scene
steps forward to make a damaging admission, it seems he may
reasonably conclude that he is no longer free to leave and that,
in effect, he is "in custody."

Lest the forcefulness of some of this writer's assertions and
the irreverence of his criticism of some state and lower federal
court cases may have deceived or misled the reader, he feels
obliged to say-after pondering dozens of cases dealing with the
possible application of Miranda to the squad car, the streets, the
home and the office-that if Professor Graham exaggerated he
did so only slightly when he remarked that "in the case of
questioning away from the police station, where there is no arrest
or detention, it is all but impossible to decide when MirandaEscobedo rights arise." What is "Custodial Interrogation?":
California's AnticijJatory Application of Miranda v. Arizona, 14
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 59, 89 (1966).
A point made at the outset of this commentary bears repeating:
As the Court must have been well aware, confining the l\1iranda
rules to station-house proceedings-which would have sufficed to
dispose of all the cases before it-would have put enormous
pressure on the police to increase "field" and "squad car"
questioning. By defining "custodial questioning" to include some
situations where a person is not in the police station or even
under "formal arrest," the Court was understandably reaching
out to protect its flanks-but necessarily most tentatively) gingerly
and uncertainly. Thus one can confidently say of the Court's
definitions of "custodial interrogation" only that if ever judicial
language was fraught with "creative ambiguity," if ever it
had "potential for expansion" or for "shrinkage" this language
does. This aspect of Miranda will be brought into sharp focus
only by new prodding of new fact situations by the United States
Supreme Court.
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Title II of The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968-Admissibility of Confessions and Eye Witness Testimony
SEc. 701. (a) Chapter 223, title 18, United States Code (relating
to witnesses and evidence), is amended by adding at the end
thereof the following new sections:

"§ 3501. Admissibility of confessions
"(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or
by the District of Columbia, a confession, as defined in subsection
(e) hereof, shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily
given. Before such confession is received in evidence, the trial
judge shall, out of the presence of the jury, determine any issue
as to voluntariness. If the trial judge determines that the confession was voluntarily made it shall be admitted in evidence
and the trial judge shall permit the jury to hear relevant evidence
on the issue of voluntariness and shall instruct the jury to give
such weight to the confession as the jury feels it deserves under
all the circumstances.
"(b) The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness
shall take into consideration all the circumstances surrounding
the giving of the confession, including ( l) the time elapsing
between arrest and arraignment of the defendant making the
confession, if it was made after arrest and before arraignment,
(2) whether such defendant knew the nature of the offense with
which he was charged or of which he was suspected at the time
of making the confession, (3) whether or not such defendant was
advised or knew that he was not required to make any statement
and that any such statement could be used against him, (4)
whether or not such defendant had been advised prior to questioning of his right to the assistance of counsel; and (5) whether
or not such defendant was without the assistance of counsel
when questioned and when giving such confession.
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"The presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned
factors to be taken into consideration by the judge need not be
conclusive on the issue of voluntariness of the confession.
"(c) In any criminal prosecution by the United States or by the
District of Columbia, a confession made or given by a person
who is a defendant therein, while such person was under arrest
or other detention in the custody of any law-enforcement officer
or law-enforcement agency, shall not be inadmissible solely because
of delay in bringing such person before a commissioner or other
officer empowered to commit persons charged with offenses against
the laws of the United States or of the District of Columbia if such
confession is found by the trial judge to have been made
voluntarily and if the weight to be given the confession is left
to the jury and if such confession was made or given by such
person within six hours immediately following his arrest or other
detention: Provided) That the time limitation contained in this
subsection shall not apply in any case in which the delay in
bringing such person before such commissioner or other officer
beyond such six-hour period is found by the trial judge to be
reasonable considering the means of transportation and the distance to be traveled to the nearest available such commissioner
or other officer.
"(d) Nothing contained in this section shall bar the admission
in evidence of any confession made or given voluntarily by any
person to any other person without interrogation by anyone, or
at any time at which the person who made or gave such
confession was not under arrest or other detention.
"(e) As used in this section, the term 'confession' means any
confession of guilt of any criminal offense or any self-incriminating
statement made or given orally or in writing.

"§ 3502. Admissibility in evidence of eye witness testimony
"The testimony of a witness that he saw the accused commit or
participate in the commission of the crime for which the accused
is being tried shall be admissble in evdence in a criminal
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prosecution in any trial court ordained and established under
article III of the Constitution of the United States."
(b) The section analysis of that chapter is amended by adding
at the end thereof the following new items:
"3501. Admissibility of confessions.
"3502. Admissibility of evidence of eye witness testmony."
Although President Johnson signed the Omnibus Crime Act
into law on June 19, 1968, he manifested a lack of enthusiasm
about Title II, which purports to "repeal" in federal prosecutions
Miranda and other recent Supreme Court cases:
Title II of the legislation deals with certain rules of
evidence only in Federal criminal trials-which account for
only 7 per cent of the criminal felony prosecutions in this
country. The provisions of Title II, vague and ambiguous
as they are, can, I am advised by the Attorney General, be
interpreted in harmony with the Constitution, and Federal
practices in this field will continue to conform to the
Constitution.
Under long-standing policies, for example, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and other Federal law enforcement
agencies have consistently given suspects full and fair warning,
that of Constitutional rights. I have asked the Attorney
General and the director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to assure that these policies will continue.

